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The constitution ‘is no more and no less than what happens’. So wrote Professor John Griffith in 
the 1978 Chorley Lecture, which was later republished in the Modern Law Review in 1979.1 It was 
not the first time that Griffith dangled this tantalizing aphorism before his readers,2 but it was this 
lecture that saw it melt into the vocabulary of public law. It might seem trite to spotlight this 
aphorism from what is a rich and intricate lecture full of important insights as well as memorable 
phrases. However, as we see it, and writing at the end of March 2019, constitutional practice 
over the last three years —or, for that matter, the last three months, the last three weeks, or 
even the last three days—underscores the continuing relevance of Griffith’s insights into the 
complex and contingent nature of the relationship between law, politics and the constitution.  
 
In the forty years since 1979, Griffith’s lecture has unquestionably become ‘one of the key texts 
of late twentieth century UK public law scholarship’, and one that is today ‘a founding text of an 
influential style of public law thinking’.3 Its appeal is manifold. It is a window into the complexity 
of its author’s constitutional thought; it encapsulates many of the themes of ‘the functionalist 
style in public law’;4 and it offers a riposte to those agitating for constitutional reform, whether 
in the late 1970s or today. But much of the lecture’s appeal lies in its many contradictions. It 
seems to represent both an end and a beginning. It signalled an end to a historic, customary 
‘political constitution’ that rested on consensus and the shared sympathies and similar impulses 
of a closed group of political elites. It anticipated instead an agonistic ‘political constitution’ that 
might be said to find expression in the hyper-politicized constitutional moment in which the UK 
currently finds itself; a period distinguished by political conflict within as well as between parties, 
where populist dynamics threaten to skewer party politics, where law agitates to supplant 
politics, and where long-standing constitutional shibboleths seem vulnerable to being upended.  
 
Griffith’s lecture, in this way, is also both time-stamped, yet timeless. It is clearly a product of the 
political and social divisions and emerging constitutional debates of the 1970s, with Griffith’s 
thesis constructed on a canvass that clearly reflected his own intellectual and personal 
development in a life that spanned most of the twentieth century. The constitutional landscape 
and intellectual terrain have changed considerably in the 40 years since the lecture. Yet this 
lecture draws on and develops themes of politics, law, democracy and authority that have been 
(and continue to be) the source of fresh and novel insights divorced from the particular political 
context within which the lecture was situated.  
 
For all of its contradictions, and possibly in part because of them, Griffith’s lecture has become a 
classic text, in the sense of being one that rewards close study, which affords special insights into 
complex phenomena, and which—at least at one point in time— challenged orthodox 
viewpoints. This special issue of the King’s Law Journal is devoted to exploring—forty years on—
the meanings, insights, limits and legacies of Griffith’s lecture. The articles in this special edition 
were presented at a workshop in September 2017 at the University of Sheffield funded by the 
MLR Seminar Fund, the School of Law at the University of Sheffield, and the Law School at 
Strathclyde University. We are very grateful to the contributors and the other participants at the 
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workshop for joining us in reflecting on the meanings and legacies of Professor Griffith’s lecture. 
We also thank Keith Ewing for extending to us responsibility for this special issue.  
 
Of course, given the degree of attention that it has received during those forty years it might be 
thought that there is nothing more to be said about Griffith’s lecture. This would be wrong, in 
our view. There is no evidence that this lecture has grown stale. On the contrary it continues to 
be a source of fresh inspiration and new insights, as we hope the essays collated in this special 
issue illustrate. In part, this lecture’s capacity to generate important insights lies in continuing 
debates about its meaning and place within the canon of public law scholarship, with different 
views on how much weight should be placed on not only what was written but why it was written. 
This is illustrated by the powerful essay that opens this special issue, where Martin Loughlin 
supplies a scorching critique of subsequent generations of so-called ‘political constitutionalists’ 
for neglecting and (in turn) distorting the complexity of Griffith’s intentions when delivering this 
lecture. Amongst the tasks of a reader of a classic text is to recover the author’s intentions, which 
can then be a source of rich insights, as ably demonstrated by Paul Scott’s essay that takes as its 
starting point the conceptualisation of faith and authority in Griffith’s lecture. But recovering of 
an author’s intentions is not the only valuable task, especially for a classic text such as this which 
has become almost an ‘authorless text’. Mark Hickford, for example, takes the lecture, and in 
particular its concern with the realities of power as revealed through time, as the starting point of 
an intriguing methodological turn towards historicity. In Michael Gordon’s essay it is 
Parliamentary sovereignty, a constitutional fundamental that is curiously absent from the lecture 
itself, that nevertheless is said to be the central organizing principle of the political constitution 
advocated by Griffith; a constitutional fundamental, Gordon says, that is threatened by its 
implication in the 2016 referendum and its aftermath for the way it has become de-coupled from 
the constitution as a working reality and that instead is asserted and defended in abstract – and, 
for that, in apolitical – terms.           
 
We are conscious that some might doubt the continued relevance of this lecture given that, over 
the past 40 years, Griffith might be said to have ‘lost the argument’. Faith in politics, and more 
generally in government, has diminished at the same time as many of the reforms that Griffith so 
strongly opposed have come to pass (such as a statutory bill of rights, the creation of a Supreme 
Court and devolution to the nations). What is more, the very function of politics arguably has 
been transformed in important ways by new public management reform and the rise of the 
regulatory state. However, rather than concede the political constitution to these reforms, a 
number of the essays in this special issue explore the challenges that a changing constitution poses. 
These essays suggest that Griffith’s lecture, and the school of political constitutionalism that it 
might be said to have stimulated, hold potential for new, more constructive understandings of 
the collaborative (rather than antagonistic) relationships between the institutions of government 
(as argued by Aileen Kavanagh in her essay) or the relationships between political 
constitutionalism, political ideology, and the right (as Graham Gee argues in his essay). In the 
contribution that closes the special issue, Marco Goldoni and Chris McCorkindale argue that a 
reflexive understanding of what precisely is political about political constitutions might lead us to 
think about the activity of politics beyond its traditional institutional forms. Together these essays 
explore what Keith Ewing terms the ‘resilience’ of the political constitution in the face of the 
constitutional reforms and changing political dynamics that have taken hold in the forty years that 
have passed since the lecture’s publication.  
 
Some might worry that there is a risk in public lawyers becoming too wedded to any given text, 
whether Griffith’s Chorley Lecture, Dicey’s Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 
or, more recently, Tom Bingham on The Rule of Law. To be sure, with any classic text, there is 
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always a danger of overstating its importance, and in so doing narrowing the range of intellectual 
inquiries pursued by later generations of public lawyers. There can be a tendency for students of 
a classic text to become (as Alasdair MacIntyre put it), ‘inhabitants’ of the text’s ‘conceptual 
world’, with the result that ‘their enquiries are no longer about the ends of life, even when these 
are the subject matter of the texts in questions, but only about the-ends-of-life-as-conceived-
within-this particular-textual-universe’.5 In this context, the risk is that a focus on this lecture 
distorts Griffith’s own genuine practical interest in—and by extension that we become detached 
from—real world questions about law, politics and constitutions. Perhaps, at times, most and 
maybe all public lawyers have been guilty of this. However, whether it is to understand what in 
the lecture he said then about the constitution, or whether it is to retrieve from the lecture what 
he still has to say to contemporary constitutional debates, it is clear that forty years later Griffith’s 
‘The Political Constitution’ continues to motivate and to agitate in almost equal measure. That 
achievement alone seems worthy of reflection and of celebration.    
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